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“A page of history is worth a volume of logic.”1
Anyone who has had the opportunity to teach corporate law under-
stands how difficult it is to provide a compelling explanation of why the
business judgment rule (the “Rule”) is so important. To provide a better
explanation of why this is so, this Article takes the approach that the Aron-
son formulation of the Rule is not the proper starting place. Instead, this
Article begins by starting with a close read of two cases that initiated the
application of the Rule under Delaware law: the Chancery Court and Su-
preme Court opinions in Bodell v. General Gas & Electric. By taking this
approach, the following insights into the Rule—which are not as readily
apparent when the starting point is Aronson—are discovered.
First, without the Rule, the raw power of equity could conceivably re-
quire all challenged board of directors (“Board”) decisions to undergo an
entire fairness review. The Rule is the tool used by a court to restrain itself
from persistently implementing such a review. This is the most important
function of the Rule. Second, as a result of the need to restrain equity, there
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1. A quote from a Supreme Court opinion delivered by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes. N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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is no room for fairness in the Rule’s formulation; fairness and fiduciary
duties must be mutually exclusive. Third, there are three policy drivers that
underlie the use of the Rule: (1) protecting the Board’s statutory authority to
run the company without the fear of its members being held liable for honest
mistakes in judgment; (2) respect for the private ordering of corporate gov-
ernance arrangements, which almost always grant extensive authority to the
Board to make decisions on behalf of the corporation; and (3) the courts’
recognition that they are not business experts, making deference to Board
authority a necessity. Additionally, the Rule is an abstention doctrine not
just in terms of precluding duty of care claims, but also by requiring courts
to abstain from an entire fairness review if there is no evidence of a breach
in fiduciary duties or taint surrounding a Board decision. Moreover, stock-
holder wealth maximization (“SWM”) is the legal obligation of the Board
and the Rule serves to support that purpose. The SWM requirement enters
into corporate law through a Board’s fiduciary duties as applied under the
Rule, not through statutory law. In essence, SWM is an equitable concept.
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INTRODUCTION
The business judgment rule (the “Rule”) is an equitable
doctrine that is the most prominent and important standard of
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judicial review under corporate law. The Rule protects a deci-
sion of a corporate board of directors (“Board”) from a fair-
ness review (“entire fairness” under Delaware law) unless a
well-pleaded complaint provides sufficient evidence that the
Board has breached its fiduciary duties or that the decision-
making process is tainted, such as with interestedness or a lack
of independence.2 However, anyone who has had the opportu-
nity to teach corporate law understands the difficulty in pro-
viding a compelling explanation of why the Rule is so impor-
tant.3 For want of a better simile, trying to explain its impor-
tance is like throwing darts at a dart board with the goal of
filling up every spot on the board. One eventually gets tired
and becomes satisfied with the spots that were hit, but under-
stands that the center of the bull’s-eye has been missed.
To provide a better understanding of the Rule’s impor-
tance, this Article takes the approach that the Aronson formula-
tion of the Rule4 is not the proper starting place for its expla-
nation. The Aronson formulation is a common starting point
because it includes an aspect of the duty of care—the need for
a Board to make a decision “on an informed basis”5—that was
not found in prior formulations used by the Delaware Su-
preme Court. Yet, starting with the Aronson formulation is like
starting in the middle of a story, with much to be lost in its
understanding.
Instead of starting with the Aronson formulation, this Arti-
cle takes the novel approach of explaining the Rule by starting
with a close reading of two cases which initiated the applica-
tion of the Rule under Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”): the Chancery Court (the “Chancery”) and Dela-
ware Supreme Court (the “Court”) opinions in Bodell v. General
2. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
3. One corporate law scholar, Lyman Johnson, even suggests that it is
time to get rid of the Rule as a judicial standard of review. See Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corpo-
rate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 423–31 (2013). Johnson would prefer
that the courts focus simply on whether a fiduciary duty has been breached,
with the Rule being reduced to a policy statement that directs the courts
“not [to] weigh in on the substantive soundness of director decisions” when
reviewing a corporate Board decision for a breach in the Board’s duty of
care. Id. at 425.
4. See infra, Part II.
5. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
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Gas & Electric (“Bodell I” and “Bodell II”).6 By taking this ap-
proach, the following insights into the Rule were discovered,
which may not have been so readily apparent by starting with
the Aronson formulation.
First, without the Rule, the raw power of equity, as made
clear in Bodell I, could conceivably require all challenged
Board decisions to undergo an entire fairness review. In the
face of this power, the issue for courts is to determine how the
interests of stockholders are to be balanced against protecting
the Board’s statutory authority to run the company without the
fear of constantly facing potential liability for honest mistakes
in judgment. Protecting against this potential liability is the
original policy driver underlying the Rule. This requires equity
to be restrained so as not to create an imbalance. To do this,
Courts use the Rule as a tool to distinguish situations in which
a Board decision should stand without further review from sit-
uations in which an entire fairness review is required and the
full force of equity is to be applied. This is the most important
function of the Rule.
Second, given the need to restrain equity, there is no
room in the Rule formulation for fairness; fairness and fiduci-
ary duties must be mutually exclusive. An entire fairness review
is not allowed unless there is evidence that a fiduciary duty has
been breached or taint surrounds the decision-making pro-
cess. If a court finds no breach or taint, then review is halted
and the decision stands, thus upholding the Board’s statutory
authority to manage the corporation. The result is that the
Rule serves as a fulcrum balancing the lever between the man-
agerial discretion of the board of directors, as provided by stat-
utory corporate law, on one end, and equity, with its focus on
fiduciary duties and the potential for an entire fairness stan-
dard of review on the other end. The Rule and its formulation
ensures that equity and statutory corporate law co-exist. Re-
moving the Rule as a standard of judicial review (if it ever were
to happen) could lead the court to ignore the implications of
applying its equitable powers without restraint, potentially al-
lowing the balance to move too far in the direction of equity
and resulting in far too many decisions coming under a fair-
6. Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp. (Bodell I), 132 A. 442 (Del. Ch.
1926), aff’d, Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp. (Bodell II), 140 A. 264 (Del.
1927).
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ness review. In essence, the Rule is a self-imposed constraint
on a court’s equitable powers.
Third, the role played by the Rule does not change under
DGCL 141(a),7 (Bodell I and II dealt with Section 4a of the old
DGCL, currently embodied in DGCL § 1528) even though two
additional policy drivers are identified which reinforce the use
of the Rule versus an automatic entire fairness review. These
policy drivers are: (1) respect for the private ordering of corpo-
rate governance arrangements, which almost always grant ex-
tensive authority to the Board to make decisions on behalf of
the corporation, and (2) the recognition by courts that they
are not business experts, making deference to Board authority
a necessity.
Fourth, the Rule is an abstention doctrine not just in
terms of precluding duty of care claims, as persuasively argued
by Stephen Bainbridge,9 but also in a more fundamental way,
by requiring courts to abstain from an entire fairness review if
there is no evidence of a breach in fiduciary duties or taint
surrounding a Board decision.
Fifth, the Rule serves to support the default legal obliga-
tion of the Board known as stockholder wealth maximization
(“SWM”), an approach to corporate governance that encour-
ages a Board to implement all major decisions with only the
economic interests of stockholders in mind. This is not readily
apparent from the Aronson formulation of the Rule. The SWM
requirement enters into corporate law through a Board’s fidu-
ciary duties as applied under the Rule, not through statutory
law. In essence, SWM is an equitable concept. The implemen-
tation of SWM is indirect as all three of the major policy driv-
ers that influence the Rule also guide courts to stay away from
a direct focus on SWM unless the Rule has been rebutted.
The discussion that follows is specifically focused on those
Board decisions which are permitted to be reviewed under the
Rule. This means that the Article minimizes the discussion of
those less common business decisions that come under corpo-
rate law’s intermediate standards of judicial review, the Revlon
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (2015).
9. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
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duty10 and the Unocal test,11 both of which are meant to pro-
tect decisions from an automatic fairness review even if ap-
plied with a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. The Article
also minimizes the discussions of those Board decisions that
must initially come under the entire fairness standard of re-
view, such as when a corporation enters into a self-dealing
transaction with a controlling stockholder.12
Also, the discussion that follows—when it references state
corporate law—has been pragmatically framed in the context
of Delaware corporate law. Delaware is the state where the vast
majority of the largest United States companies are incorpo-
rated,13 and its corporate law often serves as the authority that
other states look to when developing their own statutory and
10. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986) (establishing the Revlon duty to maximize stockholder
wealth when the break-up, sale, or merger of a company is inevitable); see
also Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994).
11. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (cre-
ating a two-pronged test, commonly referred to as the Unocal test, to review
defensive measures taken by a board of directors to repel attempts by an
outside investor or group of investors to gain control of the corporation).
12. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014) (ac-
cording to the Delaware Supreme Court, “[w]here a transaction involving
self-dealing by a controlling stockholder is challenged, the applicable stan-
dard of judicial review is ‘entire fairness,’ with the defendants having the
burden of persuasion”). However, the Rule may still apply in a transaction
where the controlling stockholder offers to buy out the minority stockhold-
ers (freeze-out) if the Board appoints a special independent committee to
negotiate the transaction on behalf of the minority stockholders and the
transaction is approved by an informed majority of minority stockholders. Id.
at 645. In addition to Kahn’s freeze-out merger scenario, it should also be
noted that courts have recently taken other action to increase the number of
Board decisions that come under the Rule, and not under an entire fairness
standard of review, as long as they are satisfied that a majority of informed
stockholders have approved the decision. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings
LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
13. See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1, 1
(2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf (stating that
Delaware is the “favored state of incorporation for U.S. businesses”). Accord-
ing to the State of Delaware website, Delaware is the legal home to “[m]ore
than 66% of all publicly-traded companies in the United States including
66% of the Fortune 500.” STATE OF DELAWARE, ABOUT AGENCY, http://corp
.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
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common law.14 Therefore, the primary examples are from Del-
aware, but the thinking is meant to be global.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the ori-
gins of the Rule as a tool used by judges to restrain themselves
from using their authority under equity to review Board deci-
sions for (entire) fairness. Judges recognized that this was a
necessity in order to protect directors from liability for honest
mistakes in judgment that turn out badly. Part II describes how
the Rule has been applied under DGCL § 141(a), the statutory
law which provides the Board with almost unlimited authority
to manage the corporation.15 Part III discusses SWM as a legal
obligation of Board decision-making and how the Rule is both
consistent with and supportive of SWM.
I.
THE POWER OF EQUITY
As early as 1742, equity recognized that corporate boards
should not be held liable for honest mistakes in judgment. Ac-
cording to the Lord Chancellor of England:
[Directors] are most properly agents to those who
employ them in this trust, and who empower them to
direct and superintend the affairs of the corporation.
In this respect they may be guilty of acts of commis-
sion or omission, of mal-feasance or nonfeasance.
Now where acts are executed within their authority,
. . . though attended with bad consequences, it will be
very difficult to determine that these are breaches of
trust. For it is by no means just in a judge, after bad
consequences have arisen from such executions of
their power, to say that they foresaw at the time what
must necessarily happen; and therefore, were guilty
of a breach of trust.16
This judicial policy of protecting board members from lia-
bility when their honest mistakes in judgment turn out badly
has been consistently identified as a major policy objective of
14. See Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties
in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393,
397 (2007).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
16. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton [1742] 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (citations omit-
ted).
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the Rule. Fifty years ago, Henry Manne stated that the Rule
“preclude[s] the courts from any consideration of honest if in-
ept business decisions, and that seems to be the purpose of the
Rule.”17 More recently, courts and commentators have be-
come aware that protecting directors from such liability also
allows for optimal risk-taking in corporate decision-making:
Ultimately, the discretion granted directors and man-
agers allows them to maximize shareholder value in
the long term by taking risks without the debilitating
fear that they will be held personally liable if the com-
pany experiences losses. This doctrine also means,
however, that when the company suffers losses, share-
holders may not be able to hold the directors person-
ally liable.18
Protecting board members from liability when their hon-
est mistakes in judgment turn out badly is not the Rule, as it is
commonly mistaken to be.19 Instead, it is a policy driver cited
by courts in justifying the use of the Rule versus the alternative
of an automatic (entire) fairness review. This will become clear
when Bodell II is discussed, but first the discussion needs to fo-
cus on Bodell I.20
A. Bodell I
In Bodell I, the plaintiffs alleged that the Board violated its
fiduciary duties by initiating a plan to sell no-par value stock
for below its fair sales value.21 In response, the Chancery had
granted a temporary restraining order.22 However, the Board
itself was not accused of self-dealing or of personally profiting
from the sales.23 Moreover, the statute which allowed for the
17. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53
VA. L. REV. 259, 271 (1967).
18. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
19. Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loy-
alty, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 680 (citing 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON
& STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 9 (5th ed. 1998 & Supp. 2002).
20. Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp. (Bodell I), 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A.
442 (1926), aff’d, 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927).
21. See id. at 122–23, 132 A. at 444.
22. See id. at 123, 132 A. at 444.
23. See id.
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issuance of no-par value stock, Section 4a of the DGCL,24 pro-
vided the Board with unrestrained authority to determine the
adequacy of the consideration to be received in exchange for
the no-par value stock as long as the Board had authority to do
so under the company’s certificate of incorporation.25
However, even in the face of this “absolute power,” the
Chancery had no problem with identifying the countervailing
power of equity26 as authority for reviewing the Board’s ac-
tions:
So far as the literal language of the section is con-
cerned, the directors may from time to time issue no
par stock for any consideration they may see fit, even
though the price they fix is far below its actual value
. . . . What I am now pointing out is simply this - that
the statute does not impose any restraint upon the
apparent unbridled power of the directors. Whether
equity will, in accordance with the principles which
prompt it to restrain an abuse of powers granted in
absolute terms, lay its restraining hand upon the di-
rectors in case of an abuse of this absolute power, is
another question which will be presently considered
and answered in the affirmative.27
If this was not clear enough, the Chancery also stated,
“But notwithstanding the absolute character of the language
in which the power to direct the directors is expressed, it can-
not be that a court of equity is powerless in proper cases to cir-
cumscribe it.”28
24. A. R. BENSON, GENERAL CORPORATION LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELA-
WARE 19 (1921). No-par common stock was approved in 1917 to be followed
by no-par value preferred stock in 1925.
25. Id.
26. According to Quillen and Hanrahan, “[t]he secret of Delaware equity
rests in two old concepts, both English in origin. First, equity is a moral sense
of fairness based on conscience. Second, equity is the recognition that the
universal rule cannot always be justly applied to the special case. Equity is the
flexible application of broad moral principles (maxims) to fact specific situa-
tions for the sake of justice. Delaware has preserved the essence.” William T.
Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery
– 1792–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 821–22 (1993). For an excellent dis-
cussion of how equity is applied under corporate law, see Lyman Johnson,
Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 709–13 (2011).
27. Bodell I, 15 Del. Ch. at 128, 132 A. at 446.
28. Id. at 129, 132 A. at 446 (emphasis added).
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As authority for using its equitable powers in the face of
statutory law that suggests otherwise, the Chancery noted,
“There is no rule better settled in the law of corporations than
that directors in their conduct of the corporation stand in the
situation of fiduciaries. While they are not trustees in the strict
sense of the term, yet for convenience they have often been
described as such.”29
In Bodell I, the Chancery begins its legal analysis by noting
that when statutory law provides the Board with authority,
there “accords to the acts of the directors a presumption in favor
of their propriety and fairness.”30 This presumption is an ac-
knowledgment of Board authority as derived through statutory
law.
Nevertheless, in identifying the balance between Board
authority and equity where a statute provides the maximum
amount of managerial discretion, the Chancery applied a bal-
ance that was strongly oriented toward equity, requiring the
Board to demonstrate fairness in their decision-making.31 This
was the result of the factual finding that the sale of equity was
to occur at a price below fair market value.32
The application of the Chancery’s fairness review focused
primarily on the substantive nature of the stock sales regarding
their overall benefits to stockholders, but also appears to have
taken into consideration director conduct and motivations by
noting that the Board was not interested in the transaction33
and by concluding that “[a] complete absence of selfish mo-
tive and of personal profit on their part forcefully argues that
29. Id. (emphasis added). Directors are fiduciaries of both the corpora-
tion and stockholders. See ROBERT C. CLARK, AGENCY COSTS VERSUS FIDUCIARY
DUTIES, IN PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56 (John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). This gives the misleading impres-
sion that they serve two masters. In Part III, it is described how the Court
reconciles this unusual situation by taking the position that the fiduciary du-
ties owed to the corporation are for the benefit of the stockholders. See infra,
Part III.
30. Bodell I, 15 Del. Ch. at 129, 132 A. at 446 (emphasis added). This is
perhaps the source for the famous presumption language in the current
Rule formulation.
31. Id. at 132, 132 A. at 448.
32. See id. at 122–23, 132 A. at 444.
33. See id. at 123, 132 A. at 444.
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judgment was formed in absolute honesty and entire good
faith.”34
The Chancery found that the shares were not sold below
the fair sales value, thus absolving the Board of any liability.35
The Chancery also vacated the outstanding restraining or-
der.36 However, was a fairness review really required? This was
the issue taken up by the Court in Bodell II.
B. Bodell II
In Bodell I, the Chancery made an emphatic declaration
that the power of equity can never be denied, even in the face
of a statutory law that provides the Board with absolute author-
ity in a specific area of corporate decision-making and where
there is no evidence of director self-interest. This declaration
is not in dispute.37 A court of equity always has the right to
circumscribe Board authority when the court perceives that a
wrong has been committed.38 However, what Bodell I did not
answer is whether a challenged Board decision would always
come under a fairness review, placing the Board in the posi-
tion of constantly facing significant potential liability for hon-
est mistakes in judgment that turn out badly. Does equity re-
quire this? If not, what kind of decision-making tool or filter
would the court use to make the determination that a fairness
34. Id. at 135, 132 A. at 449.
35. Id. at 134–37, 132 A. at 449–50.
36. Id. at 139, 132 A. at 451.
37. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 675 n.54 (Del Ch. 2007) (“That the
operation of Delaware corporate law depends importantly on the subjection
of action in conformity with legal rules to equitable principles has long been
understood.”).
38. Bodell I, 15 Del. Ch. at 129, 132 A. at 446; see also Lofland v. Cahall,
118 A. 1, 3 (Del. 1922) (“Directors of a corporation are trustees for the stock-
holders, and their acts are governed by the Rules applicable to such a rela-
tion, which exact of them the utmost good faith and fair dealing, especially
where their individual interests are concerned.”); Adams v. Clearance Corp.,
121 A. 2d 302, 306 (Del. 1956) (“When the directors, or the majority stock-
holders, exercise a power that the general corporation law confers upon
them, it is competent for anyone who conceives himself aggrieved thereby to
invoke the processes of a court of equity for protection against its oppressive
exercise. Notwithstanding therefore the absolute terms in which the power
of the directors is expressed, equity will afford protection against its wrong-
ful use.” (citations and quotes omitted)); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (“[I]nequitable action does not become per-
missible simply because it is legally possible.”).
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review was or was not required? That tool turns out to be the
Rule, the standard of judicial review that the Delaware Su-
preme Court used in Bodell II to affirm the Chancery’s deci-
sion.39
In Bodell II, the Court was not reticent in taking issue with
both the Chancery’s apparent lack of respect for the manage-
rial discretion provided by statutory law and its fairness stan-
dard of review. According to the Court, “the broad and gen-
eral language of the statute, embodied in the Certificate of In-
corporation, should be liberally construed in favor of the
directors.”40 Continuing with this line of thinking, the Court
also said:
The Legislature, in enacting the statute, meant to
clothe the directors of a corporation with exception-
ally large powers in the sale of its no par value stock.
If in the particular case there is nothing to show that
the directors did not exercise their discretion for
what they believed to be the best interest of the cor-
poration, certainly an honest mistake of business
judgment should not be reviewable by the Court.41
This is a direct repudiation of the approach applied by
the Chancery and perhaps the first case that explained why
fairness cannot be part of the Rule formulation. It makes clear
that protecting director decision-making when it only involves
honest mistakes of business judgment (most critical when di-
rector liability is involved) cannot coexist with a fairness stan-
dard of review. A fairness review is only concerned with an ob-
jective analysis into whether the results were fair to the plain-
tiffs; it does not take into consideration whether the decision
was an honest mistake of business judgment. Either fairness or
the policy of protecting honest mistakes of business judgment
can be a component of the Rule, but not both. They are mutu-
ally exclusive. The Delaware Supreme Court chose the latter in
formulating its Rule, an approach which still stands today:
39. This was perhaps the first case where the Delaware courts applied the
Rule under the DGCL, a statutory set of laws created in 1899 to allow for
general incorporation. See 21 Del. Laws 273 (1899).
40. Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp. (Bodell II), 15 Del. Ch. 420, 426, 140
A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927).
41. Id.
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It may be impossible to lay down a general rule on
this subject, but we think the discretion of a board of
directors in the sale of its no par value stock should
not be interfered with, except for fraud, actual or
constructive, such as improper motive or personal
gain or arbitrary action or conscious disregard of the
interests of the corporation and the rights of its stock-
holders.42
By using the language, “discretion of a board of directors”
this Rule formulation acknowledges the managerial authority
of the Board as provided by statutory corporate law.43 Most
importantly, however, the formulation reduces the demands
of equity by requiring only the absence of certain types of im-
proper Board conduct, namely actual or constructive fraud, in
order to allow the decision to stand. Moreover, in formulating
its Rule without the inclusion of fairness as a substantive com-
ponent, the Court established a critical precedent under Sec-
tion 4a of the old DGCL (currently DGCL § 15244) that has
been since applied to DGCL § 141(a).45 This precedent holds
that there are significant limits to the reach of equity at least
where statutory law grants the board seemingly absolute au-
thority to make corporate decisions.
In affirming the Chancery Court’s decision, the Court
found no evidence that the Board was not acting in the best
interest of the corporation and the fact that the Board was not
interested in the transaction served as significant evidence of
this.46 The Court concurred with the lower court and found
that the directors had utilized their best judgment and acted
in good faith.47 Therefore, the fairness review as required by
Bodell I was not required.
C. Fairness (Entire Fairness) as a Standard of Review
Before moving to a discussion of the Rule under DGCL
§ 141(a), it is important to understand what is meant by a fair-
42. Id.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (2015).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
46. Bodell II, 15 Del. Ch. 420, 426, 140 A. 264, 267 (the directors were not
going to financially benefit from the transaction).
47. Id. at 268.
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ness review. Bodell I required a rigorous review of the stock
sales, focusing on both the substantive and procedural nature
of the sales and on the conduct and motivations of the direc-
tors. Such a fairness review would have created a heavy burden
on a Board if it were conjured up every time an honest mistake
in judgment turned out badly. This is essentially why the Court
in Bodell II found it inappropriate to use such a review unless
its Rule had been overcome.
The fairness review found in Bodell I is the forerunner of
the review currently used by Delaware courts when the Rule is
overcome (now called “entire fairness).48 Entire fairness is a
court’s most onerous standard of review49 and the one that a
Board would most like to avoid, thus encouraging a Board to
conduct its decision-making process within the confines of the
Rule. However, while starting afresh under entire fairness does
put a heavy burden on a Board, it “is not an implication of
liability.”50 Entire fairness requires a review of the result for
“substantive fairness,” with the burden of proof on the defend-
ants.51 According to Ezra (a.k.a. Lawrence) Mitchell, an “[en-
tire] fairness [review] contemplates a range of values and fidu-
ciary conduct that properly is analyzed within the totality of a
transaction’s circumstances.”52 When this standard of review
applies, courts must “consider carefully how the board of di-
rectors discharged all of its fiduciary duties with regard to each
aspect of the non-bifurcated components of entire fairness:
fair dealing and fair price.”53 Moreover, “[n]ot even an honest
48. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A. 2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995)
(“If the [R]ule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the
proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the
‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.”); see also,
Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1112 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[T]he board’s
decision is reviewed through the lens of entire fairness, pursuant to which
the directors lose the presumption of good business judgment, and where
the Court more closely focuses on the details of the transaction and deci-
sion-making process in an effort to assess the fairness of the transaction’s
substantive terms.”).
49. Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 459 (Del. Ch.
2011).
50. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 93 (Del. 2001).
51. Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1112.
52. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.
J. 425, 427 (1993).
53. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 97.
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belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to
establish entire fairness. Rather, the transaction itself must be
objectively fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.”54
Fair dealing “embraces questions of when the transaction
was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed
to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and
the stockholders were obtained.”55 In addition, “[p]art of fair
dealing is the obvious duty of candor . . . . Moreover, one pos-
sessing superior knowledge may not mislead any stockholder
by use of corporate information to which the latter is not
privy.”56 Fair price “relates to the economic and financial con-
siderations of the proposed [transaction], including all rele-
vant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects,
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent
value of a company’s stock.”57
While in theory the review for entire fairness is a non-bi-
furcated process, in practice courts have great discretion in fo-
cusing more on one component than the other.58 For exam-
ple, “at least in non-fraudulent transactions, price may be the
preponderant consideration. That is, although evidence of fair
dealing may help demonstrate the fairness of the price ob-
tained, what ultimately matters most is that the price was a fair
one.”59 In the uncommon fact pattern where a stock price, sale
price of real estate, or level of compensation, etc. is not at is-
54. Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006) (em-
phasis added).
55. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (emphasis
added).
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Encite LLC v. Soni, No. 2476-VCG, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS
177 at *75 (Del. Ch. 2011). Memorandum opinion.
58. Valeant Pharm. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A. 2d 732 (Del. Ch. 2007) (focus-
ing on fair dealing in a Board decision to pay large cash bonuses to them-
selves and to certain non-Board employees). In the cash bonus context of
Valeant, even if the “board used an unfair process to authorize the bonuses”
it “does not end the court’s inquiry because it is possible that the pricing
terms were so fair as to render the transaction entirely fair. Nevertheless,
where the pricing terms of a transaction that is the product of an unfair
process cannot be justified by reference to reliable markets or by compari-
son to substantial and dependable precedent transactions, the burden of
persuading the court of the fairness of the terms will be exceptionally diffi-
cult.” Id. at 748 (emphasis added).
59. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); see also Encite,
2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *24.
39748-nyb_14-1 Sheet No. 24 Side B      12/08/2017   14:30:42
39748-nyb_14-1 Sheet No. 24 Side B      12/08/2017   14:30:42
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYB\14-1\NYB102.txt unknown Seq: 16  8-DEC-17 7:20
42 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:27
sue (e.g., where the Board of a non-statutory, closely-held cor-
poration provided themselves with advantageous ways to liqui-
date their illiquid company stock holdings through company
repurchases without providing such means for non-employee
stockholders60), only fair dealing may apply.61
The heavy burden found in both the fairness review ap-
plied in Bodell I and the entire fairness review, at least in terms
of the volume and duration of litigation, requires some way to
avoid an automatic fairness review of Board decisions that turn
out badly for shareholders. This makes the Rule a necessity.
D. Summary
Bodell I stands for the raw power of equity and how it can
potentially trump statutory law, even where statutory law pro-
vides the Board with unlimited decision-making authority. Ac-
cording to the court, this was true even though the court ac-
knowledged that there “accords to the acts of the directors a
presumption in favor of their propriety and fairness.”62 Bodell II
stands for the need to truly respect statutory authority, requir-
ing the courts to restrain the power of equity in the face of this
authority. This required restraint provides the foundation for
understanding the essence of the Rule.
Bodell II’s Rule formulation guides a court in how it
should apply this restraint in its review of a Board decision. It
first brings to the fore the requirement that a court must re-
spect managerial discretion. This means that fairness cannot
be the first stop in a court’s review. Instead, a gentler approach
must be taken, an approach that involves fiduciary duties, not
fairness. There is no room in the Rule formulation for fair-
ness; fairness and fiduciary duties must be mutually exclusive.
A fairness review is not allowed unless a fiduciary duty has
been breached or there is some taint surrounding the decision
such as director’ interestedness. This is the fundamental es-
sence of the Rule and if there is one thing that law students
must understand about the Rule, this is it.
60. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A. 2d 1366 (Del 1993).
61. Id. at 1376.
62. Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp. (Bodell I), 15 Del. Ch. 119, 129, 132
A. 442, 446 (1926).
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II.
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND § 141(a)
The significance of the Rule peaks when the Rule is ap-
plied under the critically important statutory corporate law
that provides the Board with authority to manage the corpora-
tion. In Delaware, this law is DGCL § 141(a), which states,
“The business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”63
On its face, this statutory law can be interpreted as provid-
ing the Board with unlimited managerial authority, similar to
the authority provided by DGCL Section 4a (as discussed in
Bodell I and II). Unlike Section 4a and its successor DGCL
§ 152,64 DGCL 141(a) is an opt-out or “default” rule, not an
opt-in rule. As a default rule, the delegation of unlimited au-
thority to the Board is not expected to be substantively altered
through a charter amendment. In practice, this has certainly
been the case, especially in the context of public companies.
Most importantly, both are examples of the private order-
ing or enabling approach found in statutory corporate law. Ac-
cording to the Court in Williams v Geier, “At its core, the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law is a broad enabling act which
leaves latitude for substantial private ordering, provided the stat-
utory parameters and judicially imposed principles of fiduciary
duty are honored.”65 Private ordering of authority is consid-
ered efficient because it allows for the implementation of mar-
ket-driven corporate governance arrangements.66 That is, “ob-
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (2015).
65. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (1996).
66. According to Professor Jonathan Macey:
[B]ecause informal norms generate outcomes that are generally
welfare-enhancing, while law at best generates outcomes that are
mixed (and tend strongly towards the welfare-reducing), informal
norms should come with a strong presumption of legitimacy. For-
mal legal rules are likely to be inefficient at best and amorally redis-
tributive at worst. Thus, under a wide range of circumstances, such
as when society is interested in maximizing utilitarian considera-
tions, and when society is interested in resolving standard legal dis-
putes within groups, lawmakers are unlikely to improve upon the
customary rules the group develops through voluntary, private in-
teraction.
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served governance choices are the result of value-maximizing
contracts between stockholders and management.”67 Courts
understand that this private ordering has been agreed to
under the sanction of statutory corporate law and will feel
compelled to respect the wishes of those parties to have the
Board manage the company with minimal interference, in-
cluding interference from the courts.68 Such respect is not
speculative. For example, when a corporation amends its char-
ter to provide for an exculpation clause to protect directors
from duty of care liability as allowed under the authority
granted by DGCL § 102(b)(7),69 courts have shown great def-
erence for the authority provided by this type of amend-
ment.70 In essence, the Board and stockholders have agreed to
contract away the Board’s fiduciary duty of care. Thus, private
ordering provides another policy rationale for why the courts
should restrain themselves when applying equitable principles
to Board decision-making, adding weight to the lever on the
side where statutory law rests and away from equity under the
Rule.
Why stockholders permit the Board unrestrained author-
ity under both DGCL § 152 and DGCL § 141(a) is based on
the recognition that the Board, with superior information, in-
cluding confidential information, is in the best position to
make the most important corporate decisions. The parties to
the corporate contract recognize that a centralized, hierarchi-
Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate
and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1140–41 (1997).
67. David F. Larcker et al., The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Reg-
ulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 431 (2011).
68. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Tension Between Hedge Fund Activism and
Corporate Law, 12 J. L. ECON. & POLICY 251, 253 (2016).
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). Section 102(b)(7) bars
any claim for money damages against the director defendants based solely
on the board’s alleged breach of its duty of care.
70. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001). Delaware courts
have also demonstrated respect for the statutory right of corporations, by
either a charter amendment or simply a Board resolution, to contract out of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty when applying the corporate opportunities doc-
trine. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2000); Gabriel V. Rauterberg &
Eric L. Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Anal-
ysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
However, as Lyman Johnson has pointed out, an exculpation clause does not
eliminate the duty of care, only the consequences of its breach when the
financial liability of the Board is the focus. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 705.
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cal authority is necessary for the successful management of a
corporation, especially as it grows to any significant size.71
Such deference to Board authority is shared by the courts
in its application of the Rule. The Delaware Supreme Court
has described the Rule as “an acknowledgment of the manage-
rial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section
141(a),”72 a point which, if seriously taken, will help make sure
the balance does not tip too far towards equity:
The “business judgment” rule is a judicial creation
that presumes propriety, under certain circum-
stances, in a board’s decision. Viewed defensively, it
does not create authority. In this sense the “business
judgment” rule is not relevant in corporate decision-
making until after a decision is made. It is generally
used as a defense to an attack on the decision’s
soundness. The board’s managerial decision-making
power, however, comes from § 141(a). The judicial
creation and legislative grant are related because the
“business judgment” rule evolved to give recognition
and deference to directors’ business expertise when
exercising their managerial power under § 141(a).73
71. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 801–16 (1986) (arguing
that “facilitation of cooperation” allows for efficiently completing large
tasks). According to Kenneth Arrow, information scattered over a large or-
ganization must be both filtered and transmitted to a centralized authority
in order for a large organization to make informed decisions and minimize
error in decision-making. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION
68–70 (1974). Arman Alchian and Harold Demsetz argued that a centralized
authority was necessary to eliminate the problems associated with having a
large number of stockholders:
If every stock owner participated in each decision in a corporation,
not only would large bureaucratic costs be incurred, but many
would shirk the task of becoming well informed on the issue to be
decided, since the losses associated with unexpectedly bad deci-
sions will be borne in large part by the many other corporate stock-
holders. More effective control of corporate activity is achieved for
most purposes by transferring decision authority to a smaller
group, whose main function is to negotiate with and manage (rene-
gotiate with) the other inputs of the team.
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 788 (1972).
72. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981)).
73. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
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Unlike the defensive nature of the policy rationale uti-
lized in Bodell II (i.e., directors should not be blamed for hon-
est mistakes of business judgment), this policy rationale fo-
cuses on how corporate decision-making is enhanced because
of a Board’s business expertise.74 Embellishing this important
point, the Court has also stated that “the core rationale of the
Rule is that judges are poorly positioned to evaluate the wis-
dom of business decisions and there is little utility to having
them second-guess the determination of impartial decision-
makers with more information (in the case of directors)
. . . .”75
Judges need to respect Board decision-making for the
simple reason that they are inferior to the Board in terms of
determining what is the best corporate decision and therefore
should not take on the role of reviewing the substantive deci-
sions of the Board, including determining the “appropriate
degrees of business risk.”76 Judges recognize that they lack in-
formation, decision-making skills, expertise, and vested inter-
est (i.e., stake in the company) relative to corporate manage-
ment.77 As stated by the Michigan Supreme Court in the fa-
mous case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,78 “[J]udges are not
business experts.”79 Therefore, as long as the courts do not
find a breach in a Board’s fiduciary duties, they typically do
not want to get involved in any type of substantive review of a
Board decision.80
In part, the humility expressed by courts with respect to
their own decision-making abilities is reflective of their under-
standing that making a business decision can be the result of a
long and complicated thought process requiring expertise that
courts do not have. The following statement, in the context of
a Board trying to make a wealth maximizing decision on be-
half of stockholders, makes that point:
74. Id.
75. Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313–14 (Del.
2015).
76. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A. 2d 327, 336 (Del Ch. 1997)).
77. Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Imple-
mentation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 406–09 (2014).
78. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
79. Id.
80. Sharfman, supra note 77, at 409–11.
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[D]etermining whether a business decision is stock-
holder wealth-maximizing is not just about plugging
in a formula and calculating the result, which any
computer or calculator can do. Rather, it refers to
the specific formula that will be utilized by manage-
ment to determine if a particular decision maximizes
stockholder wealth. One can think of this in terms of
a mathematical formula where the decision maker is
given the responsibility of choosing the variables and
estimating the coefficients of those variables. This re-
quires many sources of knowledge and expertise that
chancellors and judges lack, including experience in
the particular business that the company may be in,
product and company knowledge, management
skills, financial skills, creative and analytical thinking
pertinent to a company’s business, confidential infor-
mation, and so on. For example, who has the knowl-
edge and expertise to decide whether a distinctive
corporate culture enhances or detracts from stock-
holder value? The clear answer is that the board and
its executive management are the proper locus of au-
thority for making this decision.81
In sum, what courts desire in terms of corporate authority
can be summarized in the following statement by Professor
Stephen Bainbridge: the “[p]reservation of managerial discre-
tion should always be the null hypothesis.”82 This approach is
supported not only by the desire to refrain from punishing the
Board for honest mistakes in judgment but also by two addi-
tional policy drivers: (1) respect for the private ordering of cor-
porate governance arrangements, which almost always place
the bulk of authority for decision-making with the Board, and;
(2) courts’ recognized lack of business expertise. All three pol-
icy drivers encourage a court to use the Rule and discourage it
from going directly to an entire fairness review.
A. The Business Judgment Rule Formulation
In contrast to the Rule formulation found in Bodell II, the
current formulation of the Rule under § 141(a) (the Aronson
81. Id. at 408.
82. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 109.
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formulation) includes an aspect of the duty of care, the need
for a Board to make a decision on an informed basis:
It is a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.
Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be
respected by the courts. The burden is on the party
challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting
the presumption.83
For many, this additional requirement was a mistake, lead-
ing to the heavily criticized decision in the famous corporate
law case of Smith v Van Gorkom,84 where the Court made abso-
lutely clear that an uninformed Board decision could over-
come a court’s deference to Board authority and could create
director liability.85 In Van Gorkom, this liability occurred de-
spite the fact that the Board had agreed to sell the company
for a forty-eight percent premium above the previous day’s
closing price.86
Under Van Gorkom, to establish that a Board has made an
informed decision, a court must determine “whether the di-
rectors have informed themselves ‘prior to making a business
decision, of all material information reasonably available to
them.’”87 Gross negligence is the standard used to determine
83. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
In Aronson, the Court addressed the issue of “when is a stockholder’s de-
mand upon a board of directors, to redress an alleged wrong to the corpora-
tion, excused as futile prior to the filing of a derivative suit?” Id. at 807.
84. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
85. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel found the criticism of Van
Gorkom to be entirely justified:
It is not hard to see why the case produced such a swift and sweep-
ing reaction. Judicial inquiry into the amount of information man-
agers should acquire before deciding creates the precise difficulties
that the business judgment rule is designed to avoid. Information is
necessary for corporate managers to maximize the value of the
firm. But there is a limit to how much managers should know
before making a decision.
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 107–08 (1991).
86. See Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom,
33 Del. J. Corp. L. 287, 291 (2008).
87. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
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if there has been a breach of the directors’ duty of care in
becoming informed.88
Soon after Van Gorkom, the Delaware General Assembly,
responding to concerns that directors faced too much in the
way of personal liability, enacted DGCL 102(b)(7),89 a statu-
tory provision that protects directors from monetary liability
for any actions arising from a breach of their duty of care if
corporations opt-in through a charter amendment.90 In es-
sence, Delaware lawmakers have given Delaware corporations
the opportunity to veto the Van Gorkom decision if they found
it was not in their best interests.
However, consistent with the underlying policies of not
punishing the Board’s honest mistakes in judgment and defer-
ring to Board decision-making authority as provided by private
ordering and the court’s recognition of its lack of business ex-
pertise, the “informed” element of the Rule refers only to
“procedural due care,” not “substantive due care.”91 According
to the Delaware Supreme Court in Brehm v Eisner, “Courts do
not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do
not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due
care in the decision-making context is process due care
only.”92 In sum, meeting the requirements of procedural due
88. Id. at 873.
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). Under § 102(b)(7), stock-
holders are allowed to incorporate into their certificate of incorporation:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a direc-
tor to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision
shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any
breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; . . . ;
or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an im-
proper personal benefit.
Id.
90. Id.
91. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
92. Id. Interestingly, a valid waste claim may still exist even if the plaintiff
cannot overcome the presumption of the Rule. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriva-
tive Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73–74 (Del. 2006). In essence, waste is a standard of
review that stands outside the Rule and is applicable when irrationality is not
found to be associated with a lack of good faith:
To recover on a claim of corporate waste, the plaintiffs must shoul-
der the burden of proving that the exchange was so one sided that
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care under the Rule means that a Board has not reached their
decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure
to consider all material facts reasonably available.”93
B. Rebutting the Presumption
Since Bodell II, courts have created a fuller picture of what
kinds of conduct (fiduciary duties) and lack of taint surround-
ing the decisions (e.g., disinterestedness, independence and
rational business purpose), are required in order for a Board
decision to receive the protections of the Rule:
The business judgment rule, as a general matter, pro-
tects directors from liability for their decisions so
long as there exist “a business decision, disinteres-
tedness94 and independence,95 due care, good
no business person of ordinary, sound judgment would conclude
that the corporation has received adequate consideration. A claim
of waste will arise only in the rare, unconscionable case where di-
rectors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets. This on-
erous standard for waste is a corollary of the proposition that where
business judgment presumptions are applicable, the board’s deci-
sion will be upheld unless it cannot be attributed to any rational
purpose.
Freedman v. Adams, 58 A.3d 414, 417 (Del. 2013) (quotations and citations
omitted) (citing Disney, 906 A.2d at 74).
93. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66.
94. Under Delaware law, “[a] director is interested in a given transaction
if she stands to gain monetarily from it in a way that other stockholders do
not.” Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 466
(2008) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on
other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254).
95. Under Delaware law:
Directors must not only be independent, but must act inde-
pendently. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429 (Del. 1997).
As this Court has previously stated in defining director indepen-
dence: “[i]t is the care, attention and sense of individual responsi-
bility to the performance of one’s duties . . . that generally touches
on independence.” Id. at 430, quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 816 (Del. 1984). Where only one director has an interest in a
transaction, however, a plaintiff seeking to rebut the presumption
of the business judgment rule under the duty of loyalty must show
that “the interested director controls or dominates the board as a
whole.” Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168
(Del. 1995).
A party alleging domination and control of a company’s board
of directors bears the burden of proving such control by showing a
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faith96 and no abuse of discretion97 and a challenged
decision does not constitute fraud, illegality, ultra
vires conduct or waste.” There is a presumption that
directors have acted in accordance with each of these
elements, and this presumption cannot be overcome
unless the complaint pleads specific facts demonstrat-
ing otherwise. Put another way, under the business
lack of independence on the part of a majority of the directors.
Odyssey Partners, L.P v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 735 A.2d 386, 407 (Del.
Ch. 1999). Theoretically, a director can be “controlled” by another,
for purposes of determining whether the director lacked the inde-
pendence necessary to consider the challenged transaction objec-
tively. A controlled director is one who is dominated by another
party, whether through close personal or familial relationship or
through force of will. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n. 50 (Del.
Ch. 2002). A director may also be deemed “controlled” if he or she
is beholden to the allegedly controlling entity, as when the entity
has the direct or indirect unilateral power to decide whether the
director continues to receive a benefit upon which the director is
so dependent or is of such subjective material importance that its
threatened loss might create a reason to question whether the di-
rector is able to consider the corporate merits of the challenged
transaction objectively. Id.
Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002).
96. In Lyondell v. Ryan, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that failing to
act in good faith means that a Board has intentionally failed “to act in the
face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his
duties.” Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (quoting
Disney, 906 A.2d at 67).
97. For example, it may be an abuse of discretion when the Board refuses
to pay out a dividend even though the company has accumulated a large
amount of earnings. As stated by the Chancery Court in Eshleman v. Keenan:
That courts have the power in proper cases to compel the directors
to declare a dividend, is sustained by respectable authorities. But
that they should do so on a mere showing that an asset exists from
which a dividend may be declared, has never, I dare say, been as-
serted anywhere. In such a case a court acts only after a demonstra-
tion that the corporation’s affairs are in a condition justifying the
declaration of the dividend as a matter of prudent business man-
agement and that the withholding of it is explicable only on the
theory of an oppressive or fraudulent abuse of discretion.
22 Del. Ch. 82, 87–88, 194 A. 40, 43 (1937). See also Moskowitz v. Bantrell,
190 A.2d 749, 750 (Del. 1963) (citing Eshleman (in discussing when a court
may direct a Board to declare a dividend, the court said: “[t]he principle of
law applicable to the relief sought is well settled. Before a court will interfere
with the judgment of the Board of Directors, fraud or gross abuse of
discretion must be shown.”).
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judgment rule, the Court will not invalidate a Board’s
decision or question its reasonableness, so long as its
decision can be attributed to a rational business pur-
pose.98
If the presumption has been overcome, “the burden then
shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation
and its stockholders.”99 As a result, even though the decision
may have lost the protections of the Rule, the court cannot go
directly to a determination of damages.100 Instead, it must first
make a determination that the transaction was not entirely
fair.101 Such a finding “will be the basis for a finding of sub-
stantive liability.”102
Under this Rule formulation, relative to the Rule found in
Bodell II, the balance provided by the Rule has shifted toward
equity through the explicit requirements of independence, a
rational business purpose and most importantly, the relatively
new requirement that the Board be informed. These are addi-
tional ways for a court to move a Board decision out of the
category of Board decisions that the courts are barred from
scrutinizing and into the realm of a fairness review, notwith-
standing the prevalence of exculpation clauses that mute the
effect of a finding that the Board was not informed when it
made the challenged decision.
Therefore, while director conduct and lack of taint re-
quirements under this Rule formulation may seem more ex-
tensive and demanding than those found in Bodell II, this for-
mulation’s purpose is exactly the same: to serve as a tool that
courts can use to determine whether a Board decision should
stand or be subject to a fairness review, i.e., an entire fairness
review. These additional requirements can be understood as
simply technical corrections when put in the context of main-
taining the Rule as the first and most important line of defense
against an entire fairness review. In that vein, the presumption
98. Robotti & Co. ex rel. Gulfport Energy Corp. v. Liddell, No. 3128-VCN,
2010 WL 157474, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2010) (footnotes omitted) (quot-
ing 1 STEPHEN A. RADIN ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DU-
TIES FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS 110 (6th ed. 2009)).
99. Id. at 91.
100. Id. at 93.
101. Id.
102. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1165 (Del. 1995).
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language can be understood to mean that the court must pre-
sume that a board decision does not come under a fairness
review so long as a Board’s fiduciary duties have been met.
C. The Rule as Abstention Doctrine?
Stephen Bainbridge, one of the most important corporate
law scholars of the past twenty years, has argued that the Rule
is an abstention doctrine.103 As such, “the business judgment
rule’s function is to preclude courts from deciding whether
the directors violated their duty of care.”104 Even though re-
quired to focus on procedural due care, courts are still pre-
cluded, under the Rule, from reviewing for substantive due
care, i.e., the quality of a Board’s decisions, or for breaches in
the duty of care that arise from ordinary negligence in becom-
ing informed. According to Bainbridge, courts are willing to
abstain from the review of most duty of care claims because
they find this the best way to protect Board authority from un-
warranted court interference:
Establishing the proper mix of deference and ac-
countability thus emerges as the central problem in
applying the business judgment Rule to particular sit-
uations. Given the significant virtues of discretion,
however, one must not lightly interfere with manage-
ment or the board’s decision-making authority in the
name of accountability. Preservation of managerial
discretion should always be the null hypothesis.105
Duty of care claims that go beyond the judicially defined
carve-out will quickly be dismissed without discovery even
under the lenient standard of “reasonable conceivability,” the
standard of review that the Delaware courts use in determining
whether a complaint will survive a defendant’s motion to dis-
miss.106 That courts define the duty of care in such narrow
103. Bainbridge, supra note 9.
104. Id. at 101.
105. Id. at 109.
106. According to the Chancery Court:
As recently reaffirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, the gov-
erning pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dis-
miss is reasonable conceivability. That is, when considering such a
motion, a court must: accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the Complaint as true, accept even vague allegations in the Com-
plaint as “well-pleaded” if they provide the defendant notice of the
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terms means that the claims simply do not describe a violation
of the law.107 Given this carve-out for most duty of care claims,
the Rule can indeed be understood as an abstention doctrine.
But the Rule as a means of precluding duty of care claims
could not have been the Rule’s original intent, at least under
Delaware corporation law. At the time of Bodell I and II, in
1926 and 1927 respectively, a Board’s fiduciary duties did not
include a duty of care.108 It was not until 1963 that the Dela-
ware courts recognized the duty of care as a Board duty and it
was not even in the context of the Rule, but rather in regard to
the Board’s oversight of the company.109 Finally, in 1971, the
Delaware Chancery Court established that being informed was
part of a Board’s fiduciary duties under the Rule.110
claim, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and
deny the motion unless the plaintiff could not recover under any
reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.
This reasonable “conceivability” standard asks whether there is a
“possibility” of recovery. If the well-pled factual allegations of the
complaint would entitle the plaintiff to relief under a reasonably
conceivable set of circumstances, the court must deny the motion
to dismiss.
Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 7950-VCP (Del Ch. 2014) (citing
Central Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d
531, 536 (Del. 2011)).
107. As pointed out by Robert Rhee, the concept of the Rule as abstention
doctrine does not imply judicial abnegation:
The business judgment rule cannot be an abnegation of power be-
cause its very existence arises from the exercise of judicial lawmak-
ing. The court’s power to give deference must also mean the
court’s power to take it. . . . Rather, the systematic outcomes of no
liability are achieved because the business judgment rule reflects a
reasoned judgment of courts on the nature of a wrong; they evince
the exercise of judicial power, and not the relinquishment of it.
Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1193 (2013).
108. Bernard S. Sharfman, Being Informed Does Matter: Fine Tuning Gross
Negligence Twenty Plus Years After Van Gorkom, 62 BUS. LAW. 135, 147 (2006).
109. Id. (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.2d
125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“It appears that directors of a corporation in manag-
ing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which ordina-
rily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”).
110. Id. at 148 (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch.
1971)) (“Application of the Rule of necessity depends upon a showing that
informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment authorizing the
transaction under review.”) (emphasis added).
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The observation that the duty of care was a late arrival as
part of a Board’s fiduciary duties is not meant to imply that the
Rule was not originally meant to be an abstention doctrine.
That is, it is not necessary to focus only on the preclusion of
duty of care claims to come to the conclusion that the Rule is
and has always been an abstention doctrine, at least since Bo-
dell II. As already discussed, as a result of the application of the
Rule formulation, courts must abstain from a fairness review
when the plaintiff fails to show that the Board decision has
been tainted with fraud, interest, lack of good faith, abuse of
discretion, lack of independence, gross negligence in becom-
ing informed, etc.111 Therefore, in a very global and funda-
mental way, the Rule can be understood as an abstention doc-
trine, requiring the court to abstain from a fairness review un-
less some sort of director misconduct or taint surrounding the
decision is found.
D. Summary
The role played by the Rule does not change under
DGCL 141(a).112 However, two additional policy drivers are
identified which reinforce the use of the Rule as a means to
restrain the courts from reviewing a Board decision for fair-
ness. First, respect for the private ordering of corporate govern-
ance arrangements, which grant extensive authority to the
Board to make decisions on behalf of the corporation. Second,
the recognition by the courts that they are not business ex-
perts, meaning that they must typically defer to the judgment
of the Board in the determination of whether a Board decision
is wealth maximizing. Additionally, taints surrounding a busi-
ness decision now include lack of independence or a rational
business purpose. Moreover, the Rule is an abstention doc-
trine not just in terms of precluding duty of care claims, as
persuasively argued by Stephen Bainbridge, but also in a more
fundamental way, by requiring courts to abstain from a fair-
ness review if there is no breach in fiduciary duties or taint
surrounding a Board decision.
111. Robotti & Co. ex rel. Gulfport Energy Corp. v. Liddell, No. 3128-VCN,
2010 WL 157474, at *11 (Del. Ch. 2010) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 STE-
PHEN A. RADIN ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 110 (6th ed. 2009)).
112. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
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III.
THE RULE AND THE OBJECTIVE OF SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
The Aronson formulation does not expand on what it
means for directors to act “in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.”113 This opens the door for some to argue that the objec-
tive of Board decision-making is not SWM, but rather the bal-
ancing of the interests of the multiple stakeholders that inter-
act with the corporation. This point is very timely as a number
of academics recently signed a statement arguing in part that
the Rule serves as evidence that the Board is under no legal
obligation to maximize the wealth of stockholders:
Contrary to widespread belief, corporate directors
generally are not under a legal obligation to maxi-
mize profits for their stockholders. This is reflected
in the acceptance in nearly all jurisdictions of some
version of the business judgment rule, under which
disinterested and informed directors have the discre-
tion to act in what they believe to be in the best long
term interests of the company as a separate entity,
even if this does not entail seeking to maximise short-
term stockholder value. Where directors pursue the
latter goal, it is usually a product not of legal obliga-
tion, but of the pressures imposed on them by finan-
cial markets, activist stockholders, the threat of a hos-
tile takeover and/or stock-based compensation
schemes.114
Does the Rule really serve as evidence that corporate law
does not require the Board to maximize shareholder value?
This Part makes the argument that the answer is a decisive
“no.”
113. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812.
114. Lynn Stout et al., The Modern Corporation Statement on Company Law,
JACK G. CLARKE BUSINESS LAW INSTITUTE (Oct. 29, 2016), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848833 (this document was signed by
55 signatories, mainly corporate law scholars, but also including some promi-
nent practitioners such as Martin Lipton, the purported inventor of the
poison pill).
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A. Shareholder Wealth Maximization as the Objective
of Corporate Governance
There are several different reasons and explanations for
why it is optimal to have SWM as the objective of corporate
governance and why corporate law should support that objec-
tive by imposing legal obligations on the Board. First, unlike a
stakeholder approach (to be discussed below) where the
board of directors is given the unenviable task of balancing the
interests of multiple stakeholders without maximizing the in-
terests of any, SWM allows for the maximization of an objective
function.115 Second, by serving only one master—sharehold-
ers—a Board can be held more accountable for its decisions.
According to Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, “a man-
ager told to serve two masters . . . has been freed of both and is
answerable to neither. Faced with a demand from either
group, the manager can appeal to the interests of the
other.”116 According to Jensen, if a stakeholder approach is
taken, then “[t]he result will be confusion and lack of purpose
that will [fundamentally] handicap the firm in its competition
for survival.”117 Third, according to Easterbrook and Fischel,
one can think of SWM as the default rule under corporate law
because it is “the operational assumption of successful
firms.”118 Fourth, according to John Boatwright, “corporate
decision-making is more efficient and effective when manage-
ment has a single, clearly defined objective and shareholder
wealth maximization provides not only a workable decision
guide but one that, if pursued, increases the total wealth crea-
tion of the firm.”119
Why SWM is preferable as the corporate objective can also
be explained through two models of the corporation, the prin-
cipal-agent model and the nexus of contracts model.
115. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Cor-
porate Objective Function, 14 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 8 (2001).
116. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 38.
117. Jensen, supra note 115, at 11.
118. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 36.
119. See George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 BYU L.
REV. 1319, 1390 (2016) (citing John R. Boatright, What’s Wrong—and What’s
Right—with Stakeholder Management, 22 J. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 106, 119
(2006)).
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1. Principal–Agent Model
In a principal-agent model of the corporation, sharehold-
ers are viewed as owners of the corporation and Boards as
their agents.120 However, the typical separation within the cor-
poration of ownership from control creates great potential for
managerial self-dealing and shirking. If realized, the results
are increased agency costs, including Board decisions that are
not focused on SWM. Agency costs are a detriment to share-
holder profit. Therefore, directors should be legally bound to
minimize agency costs with the objective of maximizing share-
holder profits.
2. Nexus of Contracts Model
Michael Jensen and William Meckling would describe an
organization that takes the corporate form as a legal fiction
that serves “as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships
among individuals.”121 Under a nexus of contracts or “con-
tractarian” model of the corporation, shareholders are not
perceived to own the corporation but are considered to be
only one of many parties that contract with the corporation.122
Nevertheless, the board of directors still has fiduciary duties to
maximize shareholders’ wealth.123 This is a result of the hypo-
thetical bargain struck between shareholders and the other
parties in the corporation.124
In this hypothetical bargain, shareholders, the sole claim-
ants to the residual cash flows generated by the firm, would
argue that since they are the least contractually protected rela-
tive to other parties, they deserve SWM as the gap filler in their
corporate contract.125 That is, they are the parties to the cor-
porate contract that have the greatest risk of ending up with
nothing as a result of their dealings with the corporation. In
the context of public companies, shareholders enforce their
120. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2002).
121. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310
(1976).
122. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corpo-
rate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 547–48 (2003).
123. Id. at 548.
124. See id. at 547–48.
125. See id. at 547–48, 579.
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preference for SWM through the market for corporate con-
trol126 and hedge fund activism.127
One reason why other stakeholders would support a
Board and executive management targeting SWM is because
all other parties that have contracted with the corporation
must be paid off prior to the shareholders receiving any
residual.128 As stated by Henry Manne, SWM as the corporate
objective is an example of “pure positive economics”129 and
should be accepted as such.
Like the principal-agent model of the corporation, a
nexus of contracts model tells us to expect the corporate ob-
126. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965). Manne provides the following description of how the
market for corporate control operates:
Briefly, the market for corporate control in our system operates in
the following manner: if an existing corporation with publicly
traded shares is poorly managed, holders of those shares will re-
spond by selling. This will drive the price down to the point indi-
cated by the quality of management which the corporation is re-
ceiving. As the price of securities of any corporation is thought to
be low relative to the price that would be generated by more effi-
cient managers, the stage is set for the critical functioning of the
market for corporate control. Outsiders . . . will respond to the
opportunity to make substantial capital gains (not necessarily in the
tax sense) by buying control, managing the company efficiently,
and then perhaps disposing of the shares. It is not necessary that
they remain permanently to manage the business.
Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares – A Reply to Chairman Cohen,
1967 DUKE L.J. 231, 236 (1967) (citations omitted).
127. An activist hedge fund works in a similar manner to the potential
acquirer. The difference is that the activist hedge fund attempts to correct
inefficiencies through its influence, not its control of the company. It ac-
quires a significant but not controlling share in a company at a relatively low
price with the expectation that existing inefficiencies will eventually be cor-
rected through its efforts and the price will rise to reflect these enhanced
efficiencies. In essence, hedge fund activism provides a corrective function
similar to, but with less investment and more advocacy than, what is found in
the market for corporate control. See Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory of Share-
holder Activism and Its Place in Corporate Law, 82 TENN. L. REV. 791, 804–07
(2015); see also Bernard S. Sharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board
Independence: Creators or Destroyers of Long-Term Value?, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 813 (2016).
128. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 38 (“[M]aximizing profits
for equity investors assists the other ‘constituencies’ automatically.”).
129. E-mail from Henry G. Manne, Professor Emeritus of Law, Geo. Ma-
son Univ., to Bernard S. Sharfman (Dec. 29, 2012) (on file with author).
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jective to be SWM. However, unlike the principal-agent model,
it does not suggest that an exclusive focus on minimizing
agency costs is the only way to achieve that objective. From a
nexus of contracts approach, that determination should be up
to the organizers of the corporation with input from all stake-
holders. For example, the critical question of what should be
the balance of power between the Board and shareholders
needs to be resolved prior to commencing operations as a cor-
poration. This, of course, is referred to as the private ordering
of corporate governance arrangements and is assumed to be
value-maximizing for all stakeholders, including shareholders.
Again, the balance of authority is almost always tilted heavily
toward the Board.
If one is to think of the corporation as a nexus of con-
tracts, then one must also include the role played by the courts
in making sure those contracts are enforced. The courts create
fiduciary duties which serve “as gap-filling devices for incom-
plete contracts between shareholders and firm managers.”
Moreover, if fiduciary duties are crafted carefully to maximize
shareholder value,130 this would mean that all stakeholders
would benefit from their application. However, the three pol-
icy drivers already discussed—(1) protecting the Board from
liability for honest mistakes in judgment, which also serves the
purpose of allowing the Board “to maximize shareholder value
in the long term by taking risks without the debilitating fear
that they will be held personally liable if the company exper-
iences losses”131; (2) deference to private ordering as author-
ized by statutory law, and; (3) courts’ recognition that the
Board, and not the courts, is in the best position to make cor-
porate decisions—severely restrain judicial desire to take an
active role in arbitrating disputes. These drivers strongly en-
courage courts, as a means of maximizing shareholder value,
to defer to the judgment of the Board.
B. A Stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance
Those who signed off on the statement rejecting SWM as
the legal objective of Board decision-making most likely be-
130. Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 607 (2007).
131. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
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lieve in a stakeholder model of the corporation. In such a
model, there is no one stakeholder holding the position of
residual claimant. According to Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman, there are two types of stakeholder models.132 The
first model is called a “‘fiduciary’ model of the corpora-
tion.”133 In this model, “the board of directors functions as a
neutral coordinator of the contributions and returns of all
stakeholders in the firm.”134 This is in contrast to another type
of stakeholder model which they describe as a “ ‘representa-
tive’ model of the corporation.”135 In this model, “two or more
stakeholder constituencies appoint representatives to the
board of directors, which then elaborates policies that maxi-
mize the joint welfare of all stakeholders, subject to the bar-
gaining leverage that each group brings to the boardroom ta-
ble.”136
From a normative perspective, a stakeholder model would
allow, without legal ramifications, a Board to consider multiple
stakeholders, not just stockholders, in its decision-making.
This would require the Rule to protect the interests of multi-
ple stakeholders, not just stockholders. As a result, director
conduct, as embodied in fiduciary duties, would not have
SWM as the objective of this conduct.
Perhaps the best-known stakeholder model in corporate
law literature is the team production model of Margaret Blair
and Lynn Stout.137 They use their model, a fiduciary model, to
argue that SWM is not the correct objective138 of a public com-
pany139 and that this conclusion is already recognized by
courts.140
132. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 447–48 (2001).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
138. Id. at 249 (“In this Article we take issue with . . . the stockholder
wealth maximization goal . . . .”).
139. Blair & Stout focus exclusively on the corporation as a public com-
pany. Id.
140. Id. at 287–319. At the time of their article’s publication, this was a
relatively new argument. Id. at 252–53.
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Blair and Stout model the public company as a team of
members who make firm-specific investments in the corpora-
tion with the goal of producing goods and services as a team
(“team production”), with the board of directors serving as a
“mediating hierarchy.”141 In this role, board members are
“mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’
competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy
enough that the productive coalition stays together.”142
Any person or entity that makes a specialized investment
that has little or no value outside the joint enterprise (a “firm-
specific” investment) is a member of the team.143 The result is
“that no one team member is a ‘principal’ who enjoys a right
of control over the team.”144 Team members are primarily
made up of executives, rank-and-file employees, and equity in-
vestors, but can also include researchers, creditors, the local
community, marketers, and vendors who provide specialized
products and services to the firm.145 Like equity investors,
these stakeholders have made firm-specific investments and
therefore must be considered residual interest holders, pro-
tected only by long-term, implicit agreements (non-contrac-
tual and therefore not legally enforceable) that they enter into
because they trust the board of directors to do its best to en-
sure the stakeholders recoup their investments.146
In their model, Blair and Stout suggest that “the business
judgment rule may help prevent coalition members (and espe-
cially stockholders) from using lawsuits as strategic devices to
extract rents from the coalition. This is because the Rule works
to ensure that directors can only be found liable for breach of
the duty of care in circumstances where a finding of liability
serves the collective interests of all the firm’s members.”147
Moreover, Blair and Stout find support for their understand-
ing in the Aronson formulation148 of the Rule, since it omits
express language stating that directors who act in “the best in-
141. Id. at 271–76.
142. Id. at 281.
143. Id. at 272.
144. Id. at 277.
145. Id. at 288.
146. Id. at 274–76.
147. Id. at 300.
148. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
39748-nyb_14-1 Sheet No. 35 Side A      12/08/2017   14:30:42
39748-nyb_14-1 Sheet No. 35 Side A      12/08/2017   14:30:42
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYB\14-1\NYB102.txt unknown Seq: 37  8-DEC-17 7:20
2017] THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 63
terests of the company”149 do so solely for the benefit of share-
holders. While it is not known why the Court did not clarify
what “best interests” means in the context of the Rule, it
should be noted that the Aronson formulation was applied in a
derivative suit where shareholders were suing on behalf of the
corporation. In that case, the Court may simply have felt there
was no need to clarify what “best interests” means. Neverthe-
less, Blair and Stout argue that the Rule works to support all
team members, not just stockholders, when it is used to de-
fend a legal challenge to a Board decision.
C. For the Benefit of Stockholders
While the stakeholder approach of Blair and Stout has
much appeal, a much stronger argument can be made that the
Board does have a legal obligation to maximize stockholder
value and that the Rule, as applied, facilitates fulfillment of
this legal requirement.
Surprisingly, this argument begins by noting that statutory
corporate law is silent regarding this objective. Instead, DGCL
simply states that corporations can be formed “to conduct or
promote any lawful business or purposes.”150 This silence re-
garding the objective of the corporation has always been the
approach of statutory corporate law. As a result, statutory cor-
porate law must be understood as being concerned only with
the “basic organizational design” of the corporation: its attrib-
utes as a legal entity (such as limited liability for stockholders),
and how its default rules distribute decision-making author-
ity.151
So, where does the idea of SWM as a legal requirement
come from? In yet another twist, the idea is derived from
courts applying principals of equity when determining if a
Board has breached its fiduciary duties as applied under the
Rule. In essence, SWM is a creation of equity, and not of statu-
tory law.
149. Blair & Stout, supra note 137, at 300.
150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (1998).
151. Jonathan R Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to
Non-shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1266, 1269 (1999) (“Indeed, the very justification for having different
types of business organizations is to permit investors, entrepreneurs, and
other participants in the corporate enterprise to select the basic organiza-
tional design they prefer from a menu of standard form contracts.”).
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Under the Rule, fiduciary duties are a means to an end.
They embody the type of conduct that the courts require of
directors in order to avoid having their decisions fall under an
entire fairness review. The courts have significant latitude in
defining what that conduct should be. For example, as noted
above, the duty of care is only procedural due care in the Aron-
son formulation. But most importantly, this conduct requires
the Board to act in the best interests of stockholders. This was
clearly spelled out in a series of statements by the Delaware
Supreme Court in NACEPF v. Gheewalla,152 a case which an-
swered the critical question of whether the Board still owed
fiduciary duties solely to its stockholders when the corporation
entered the “zone of insolvency,” i.e., when it is financially dis-
tressed and may become insolvent.
Gheewalla begins by explaining why only stockholders are
given the right to bring derivative suits:
It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to
the corporation. When a corporation is solvent, those
duties may be enforced by its stockholders, who have
standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of the
corporation because they are the ultimate benefi-
ciaries of the corporation’s growth and increased
value.153
In opposition to a stakeholder model of the corporation
such as the team production model, this statement reflects the
understanding that only stockholders hold residual claims to
the cash flows of the corporation.
The Court then goes on to explain that the separation of
ownership and control as provided by the default rules of stat-
utory corporate law is the reason fiduciary duties must be ap-
plied by the courts for the benefit of stockholders:
Delaware corporate law provides for a separation of
control and ownership. The directors of Delaware
corporations have ‘the legal responsibility to manage
the business of a corporation for the benefit of its
stockholder owners.’ Accordingly, fiduciary duties
152. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
153. Id. at 101.
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are imposed upon the directors to regulate their con-
duct when they perform that function.154
Moreover, the Court stated that even when a corporation
is in the zone of insolvency, a Board still owes fiduciary duties
to stockholders and not to creditors:
When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone
of insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does
not change: directors must continue to discharge
their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stock-
holders by exercising their business judgment in the
best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its stock-
holder owners.155
Here, we have the Court telling us exactly what the phrase
“best interests of the corporation” should mean in the context
of a Rule review: the protections of the Rule will apply if Board
decisions are made for “the benefit of its stockholder owners.”
Vice Chancellor Laster, in In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Liti-
gation,156 encapsulates this thinking in the following quote:
It is, of course, accepted that a corporation may take
steps, such as giving charitable contributions or pay-
ing higher wages, that do not maximize profits cur-
rently. They may do so, however, because such activi-
ties are rationalized as producing greater profits over
the long-term. Decisions of this nature benefit the
corporation as a whole, and by increasing the value
of the corporation, the directors increase the share of
value available for the residual claimants. Judicial
opinions therefore often refer to directors owing fi-
duciary duties to the corporation and its sharehold-
ers. This formulation captures the foundational rela-
tionship in which directors owe duties to the corpora-
tion for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s residual
claimants. Nevertheless, stockholders’ best interest
must always, within legal limits, be the end. Other
constituencies may be considered only instrumentally
to advance that end.157
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
157. Id. at 36–37.
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If that was not clear enough, Vice Chancellor Laster
stated in The Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp.,
“Delaware case law is clear that the board of directors of a for-
profit corporation . . . must, within the limits of its legal discre-
tion, treat stockholder welfare as the only end, considering
other interests only to the extent that doing so is rationally
related to stockholder welfare.”158
These statements are explicit endorsements of SWM and
a direct repudiation of the idea that corporate law espouses a
stakeholder model of the corporation. Almost 100 years ago
this same understanding was espoused by the Michigan Su-
preme Court in the famous corporate law case of Dodge v. Ford
Motor, Co., noted above.159 In Dodge, the Court found that the
Board abused its discretion in withholding a special dividend
payment because its decision to do so was a result of intention-
ally disregarding the interests of stockholders.160 Speaking in
terms of the duties that the Board and Henry Ford owed to
minority shareholders under corporate law,161 the Court
stated that the Board had a legal obligation to maximize the
profits of the corporation for the benefit of stockholders:
A business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The pow-
ers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the
choice of means to attain that end and does not ex-
tend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits or the nondistribution of profits among stock-
holders in order to devote them to other purposes.162
This legal obligation was a result of the court applying its
power of equity, as opposed to implementing statutory corpo-
rate law. In sum, equity requires the objective of the Rule to be
158. Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108-VCL,
2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at *45 (Ch. Apr. 14, 2017) (citations omitted).
159. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (1919).
160. Id. at 684–85.
161. Id. at 684. (“There should be no confusion . . . of the duties which
Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public
and the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minor-
ity stockholders.”)
162. Id. George Mocsary notes that this was not something that the Dodge
court came up with out of the blue, but an affirmation of Michigan case law.
See Mocsary, supra note 119, at 1344.
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SWM and only SWM. Unfortunately, starting with the Aronson
formulation of the Rule may cause this to be overlooked.
D. The Continued Denial of SWM
Even in the face of clear statements by the courts that
SWM is a legal obligation of all Board decision-making under
corporate law, continued resistance to SWM should still be ex-
pected. I expect this for the following three reasons. First, as
already mentioned, statutory corporate law is silent on SWM.
This opens the door for those who believe in a stakeholder
model of the corporation to argue that corporate law does in-
deed support such an approach in practice. Second, those who
believe in a stakeholder model are not willing to accept SWM
as being the objective of equitable principles, no matter how
many times courts state this to be their understanding. Per-
haps this is just inconsistent with their long-held views on what
equity means and therefore cannot be accepted as true. Yet,
what could be fairer to shareholders and other stakeholders
who contract with the corporation than to require that Board
decision-making be targeted to SWM if all parties benefit from
such an objective? Third, the courts utilize the Rule in an indi-
rect way to maximize shareholder value. This last point re-
quires further explanation.
When a court reviews a Board decision under the Rule, a
decision will rarely lose the protections of the Rule just be-
cause the decision was sub-optimal in terms of SWM. In this
context, the protections will be lost only if it is clear that the
decision was made without stockholder interests in mind, e.g.
in Dodge, where the Court found that the Board had abused its
discretion when it withheld the annual payment of its special
dividend.163
However, this does not mean that the courts are not fo-
cused on SWM as the objective of a Board’s fiduciary duties
per se; it simply means that courts must restrain themselves in
making such a determination. Underlying this approach are
163. This is consistent with what then Chancellor William Chandler said
in the context of a rights plan (poison pill) as reviewed under the Unocal
test: “Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a rights
plan to defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth
maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties
under Delaware law.” eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1,
35 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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the three policy drivers that have already been discussed; driv-
ers which direct a court to forego a direct focus on SWM
under the Rule. Instead, courts focus on the conduct of the
directors and evidence of taint surrounding the decision-mak-
ing process: fraud, self-dealing, lack of independence, etc. In
essence, protecting the ability of Boards to make decisions
without interference by shareholders and courts is the best way
to ensure that SWM occurs.164 However, this lack of direct fo-
cus on SWM provides the opportunity for those so willing to
interpret this approach as a court’s lack of interest in SWM,
thereby helping make their case that the court is endorsing a
stakeholder approach to corporate law over SWM.165
E. Summary
While one can argue that corporate law encompasses a
stakeholder model and that the Rule serves as evidence of this,
a better argument is that the legal obligation of the Board is
SWM and that the Rule serves to support that purpose and
only that purpose.166 Case law clearly states that the Board is
under a legal obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. The
requirement of SWM enters corporate law through a Board’s
fiduciary duties, not through statutory law. In essence, SWM is
an equitable concept. The implementation of SWM is indirect,
as all three of the major policy drivers that influence the Rule
guide courts away from a focus on SWM unless the Rule has
been rebutted, either by a breach in a Board’s fiduciary duties
or because the court has identified a taint surrounding the de-
cision-making process.
164. Sharfman, supra note 77, at 399–412.
165. Id. at 400. (“Preserving managerial discretion necessarily means that
fiduciary duties will be weak and that courts will primarily refrain from deter-
mining whether a decision maximizes shareholder wealth. The problem is
that this approach is counterintuitive and therefore subject to being misun-
derstood, especially by those who have been trained in the law and believe
that accountability should always be the default rule.”).
166. While beyond the scope of this Article, a stakeholder model, such as
team production, may be appropriate in the special case of a public benefit
corporation (PBC). Newly enacted DGCL 365(a) allows the Board to man-
age the PBC in a manner that balances the interests of stockholders and
those stakeholders who have made a significant non-stock investment in the
corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013).
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CONCLUSION
In the court’s decision in Bodell I, one is immediately
struck by the power of equity and how the court felt so easily
justified in challenging statutory law, Section 4a of the DGCL
(currently DGCL § 152167), with a fairness review of a Board
decision even when the Board had statutory authority to act
without restraint.168 The Court in Bodell II took a more sophis-
ticated approach, understanding that corporate law is all
about the separation of ownership from control and how the
interests of stockholders must be in balance with the Board’s
statutory authority. The policy driver behind this approach is
that the Board should be allowed to run the company without
the fear of constantly facing potential liability for honest mis-
takes in judgment. For this to occur, equity must be restrained.
In order to implement such restraint, the Court employed the
Rule: the tool used to determine when a Board decision
should stand without further review and when a fairness review
is required and the full force of equity is to be applied. Here,
the Court made clear that under the Rule, the review of a
board decision could not include fairness unless a court had
made a finding that a fiduciary duty had been breached or
some sort of taint had surrounded the decision (i.e., inter-
estedness). To serve as this tool of restraint is precisely why the
Rule must be retained in its present form. If courts were to
lose this ability to restrain themselves from imposing a fairness
review, then Board decision-making and shareholder wealth
would doubtless suffer as a result.
It should now be easy to see that the defining moment in
the history of the Rule was not the famous case of Smith v. Van
Gorkom,169 where the Court made absolutely clear that director
liability could result from an uninformed Board decision, but
the much older case of Bodell II.170 In Bodell II, the Court, by
precluding a fairness review of a Board decision unless a fidu-
ciary duty had been breached or some sort of taint had sur-
rounded the decision, established the Rule as an abstention
doctrine in the most fundamental way.
167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (2015).
168. Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442, 444 (1926).
169. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
170. Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 267 (1927).
